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to the King-Crane Commission 
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ABSTRACT   The King-Crane Commission, named after its two chairs, Henry Churchill 
King (1858-1934) and Charles R. Crane (1858-1939), was an American investigative 
commission set up to explore possible political arrangements for the former Ottoman Empire 
in the aftermath of World War I and the collapse of the Empire. While most research has 
dealt with the issue of whether the petitions submitted to the King-Crane Commission were a 
genuine manifestation of ‘public opinion’ or merely manipulations by interested elite parties, 
this article shifts the focus beyond this debate. We argue that a textual analysis of these 
petitions can shed light on the transformation of the traditional Ottoman form of appeal into 
a modern political tool used to recruit and generate ‘public opinion’ and foster modern 
political discourse. We first present a historical overview of petitioning in the Ottoman 
Empire and the key changes in petitioning practices in the last half of the nineteenth century. 
We then discuss the King-Crane petitions and highlight their differences from traditional 
petitions, as well as their contribution to the emerging national discourse in Greater Syria. 
We show that petitions shifted toward stances that were more ideological and political in 
nature, a development that coincided with the collapse of the Empire. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The King-Crane Commission, named after its two chairs, Henry Churchill King (1858-1934) 
and Charles R. Crane (1858-1939), was an American investigative commission set up to 
explore possible political arrangements of the former Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of 
World War I and the collapse of the Empire.
1
 The Commission travelled for a month 
throughout southern Turkey and Greater Syria in the summer of 1919 before going to 
Istanbul to write its final report.
2
 The report was submitted to the American delegation to the 
                                                 
* Yuval Ben-Bassat and Fruma Zachs are Lecturers at the Department of Middle Eastern History at 
the University of Haifa. Author’s note: We would like to thank Oberlin College and the University of 
Illinois for letting us use reproductions from their collections of petitions submitted to the King-Crane 
Commission. We would also like to thank Ziv and Idan Orenstein for locating the petitions.  
1
 Ken Grossi, Maren Milligan, and Ted Waddelow, “Restoring Lost Voices of Self-Determination,” 
King-Crane Commission Digital Archival Collection, Oberlin College Archives (August 2011), at 
http://www.oberlin.edu/library/digital/king-crane/intro.html (last accessed on 11.02.14); for a full 
interactive map of the Commission’s tour, see http://www.oberlin.edu/library/digital/king-
crane/map.html (last accessed on 11.02.14). 
2
 Initially the Commission was designed to be an international mission involving representatives from 
the victorious Allied Powers, similar to other fact-finding commissions established as part of the Paris 
Peace Conference to make the necessary arrangements after the defeat of the Central Powers. 
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peace talks in Paris and then to the White House, but its recommendations never materialized 
and with the passing of time it was largely forgotten. Nonetheless, it has attracted much 
attention in the literature dealing with post-Ottoman policies in the Middle East over the 
years.
3
 
During its investigative journey the King-Crane Commission met with 442 delegations
4
 
and received 1,863 petitions from individuals and groups.
5
 The Commission’s report states 
that as it “progressed northward the petitions became more numerous, due to the increased 
time afforded for knowledge of the Commission’s coming, for the preparation of petitions, 
for the activities of propaganda agents, and for the natural crystallization of public opinion.”6 
The Commission used the petitions to assess the people’s preferences with regards to the 
region’s future after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.7 It assumed that petitioning was the 
best way to evaluate public opinion and it encouraged the local population to do so either in 
writing or orally during meetings with the Commission during its tour in the region.
8
 
However, as suggested in the quotation above, there is evidence that the petitions were 
not spontaneous and that most were formulated by interested parties who circulated prepared 
texts and statements that appeared in the petitions on a mass scale.
9
 Such political wrangling 
and attempts to marshal public opinion are perhaps not surprising if we consider the 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
Eventually, however, as a result of French and British foot-dragging, it became an exclusively 
American commission. See Grossi et al., “Restoring Lost Voices of Self-Determination.” 
3
 Harry N. Howard, “An American Experiment in Peacemaking: The King-Crane Commission,” The 
Moslem World 32/2 (April 1942), 122-146; idem, The King-Crane Commission: An American Inquiry 
in the Middle East (Beirut: Khayats, 1963); E. Knee, “The King-Crane Commission of 1919: The 
Articulation of Political Anti-Zionism,” American Jewish Archives 29 (1977), 22-54; James Gelvin, 
“The Ironic Legacy of the King-Crane Commission,” in Lesch, David W. (ed.), The Middle East and 
the United States. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1996, 13-29; idem, Divided Loyalties: Nationalism 
and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of 
California, 1998), 150-153; Michael Reimer, “The King–Crane Commission at the Juncture of 
Politics and Historiography,” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 15/2 (2006), 129-150. 
4 Grossi et al., “Restoring Lost Voices of Self-Determination.” 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 See the full text of the Commission’s report at: The Internet Archive, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080526055304/http://www.ipcri.org/files/kingcrane.html (last accessed 
on 11.02.14). 
7 Not all the petitions can be accessed today and they are not held in one single collection, even 
though an attempt to locate, document, and preserve the petitions is currently being undertaken by the 
Oberlin College Archives. 
8 Howard M. Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle East, 1914-1924 (London: Allen Lane, The 
Penguin Press, 1969), 267-268. 
9
 James Gelvin, “Demonstrating Communities in Post-Ottoman Syria,” The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 25/1 (1994), 32-33; idem, Divided Loyalties, 260-286. Howard writes 
with respect to the representativeness of the petitions that “[t]here were some qualifications to the 
general accuracy of these reflections of popular sentiment. In the first place, the number of petitions 
from the various sections of Syria was not proportional to their respective populations […]. Secondly, 
“the number of petitions from the different religious organizations” was “not proportional to the 
numerical strength of the religious faiths” […]. Thirdly, many petitions revealed “the influence of 
organized propaganda,” as was sometimes indicated by verbal similarities or identical wording, 
sometimes by printed forms, and finally by the use of models. There was also external evidence of 
pressure and propaganda, for instance when “the same Arab agent was observed in four cities in 
Palestine, assisting in the preparation of petitions […]. Finally, the value of the individual petitions 
varied with the number of signatures, although mere numbers could not be taken as the sole criterion.” 
See Howard, The King-Crane Commission, 142-143.  
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magnitude of the political developments at that historical moment. Nevertheless, it 
immediately raises the issue of why the Americans chose such a methodology to evaluate the 
wishes of the people of Greater Syria. 
In his memoirs, David Lloyd George (1863-1945), the British Prime Minister at the 
time, provides a partial explanation: 
 
[US President Woodrow Wilson] suggested that the fittest men that could be obtained 
should be selected to form an Inter-Allied Commission to go to Syria, extending their 
inquiries, if they led them beyond the confines of Syria. Their object should be to 
elucidate the state of opinion and the soil to be worked on by any mandatory. They 
should be asked to come back and tell the Conference what they found with regard to 
these matters. He made the suggestion, not because he lacked confidence in the experts 
whose views he had heard, such as Dr. Howard Bliss and General Allenby. These, 
however, had been involved in some way with the population, with special objects either 
educational or military. If we were to send a Commission with no previous contact with 
Syria, it would, at any rate, convince the world that the Conference had tried to do all it 
could to find the most scientific [our emphasis] basis possible for a settlement…He 
would send it with carte blanche to tell the facts as they found them.
10
 
 
The Commission itself also stipulated why petitions were believed to represent the people’s 
views, despite reservations on the part of its members (see Appendix 1). It outlined its 
mission as follows: 
 
To meet in conference individuals and delegations who should represent all the 
significant groups in the various communities, and so to obtain as far as possible the 
opinions and desires of the whole people. The process itself was inevitably a kind of 
political education for the people, and besides actually bringing out the desires of the 
people, had at least further value in the simple consciousness that their wishes were 
being sought. We were not blind to the fact that there was considerable propaganda; 
that often much pressure was put upon individuals and groups; that sometimes 
delegations were prevented from reaching the Commission; and that the representative 
authority of many petitions was questionable. But the Commission believes that these 
anomalous elements in the petitions tend to cancel one another when the whole 
country is taken into account, and that, as in the composite photograph, certain great, 
common emphases are unmistakable.
11
 
 
Members of the King-Crane Commission were perfectly aware that most petitions were 
initiated by political actors like Emir Faysal (1885-1933) and his followers. In one place they 
wrote that: 
 
The 1863 petitions received by the American Commission in Syria and the summary 
tables prepared from them cannot of course be regarded as a mathematically accurate 
analysis of the real desires of the peoples of Syria. There are at least five unavoidable 
difficulties that have qualified their accuracy…Yet despite these five qualifications, it 
is believed that the petitions as summarized present a fairly accurate analysis of 
present political opinion in Syria. The great majority of irregularities offset one 
another.
12
 
 
                                                 
10
 Quoted in Harry N. Howard, The King-Crane Commission: An American Inquiry in the Middle East 
(Beirut: [Khayats], 1963), 32-33. 
11 Harry N. Howard, “An American Experiment in Peacemaking: The King-Crane Commission,” The 
Moslem World 32/2 (April 1942), 133 (a quote from the commission’s report as published in 1922 in 
The Editor and Publisher). 
12
 http://web.archive.org/web/20080526055304/http://www.ipcri.org/files/kingcrane.html  (last 
accessed on 11.02.14)  
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Given the above, it is clear that Wilson considered that the best way to determine the future 
of Syria and to evaluate the wishes of its people was to apply a “scientific” method. The 
Americans perceived “public opinion” as a “gross aggregate of individual opinions freely 
expressed rather than a consentient position articulated by an elite.”13 Hence, consistent with 
Wilson’s agenda of self-determination, the members of the Commission believed that 
petitioning was the most productive way to determine what the “public” in Greater Syria 
wanted. The time-honored practice of petitioning was familiar to the locals who made 
extensive use of it during Ottoman times, admittedly under different circumstances and for 
different aims. 
In this article, we historicize the King-Crane petitions and discuss their aims and 
influence. We argue that the change in the nature of petitioning in Greater Syria toward 
stances that were more ideological and political in nature reflected a turning point in the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, as can best be seen in the case of petitions submitted to the 
King-Crane Commission. These petitions were based on political considerations, demands, 
and arguments, unlike past petitions addressed to the Sultan. As will be discussed below, they 
differed from traditional Ottoman petitions in many respects and characteristics. 
Drawing on arguments presented by David Zaret in his article on petitions during the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England, our intention is to show that petitions such as those 
presented to the King-Crane Commission were not only “an extension or revival of well-
accepted principles of petitioning” that previously existed during the Ottoman era.14 Rather, 
they also included changes that “violated traditional restrictions on the expression of 
grievance in petitions.”15 This shift did not occur overnight. During the preceding decades, 
the well-known Ottoman traditional practice of petitioning (generically known as șikayet) had 
developed in “new directions that altered the content as well as the scope of political 
communication.”16 We first present a historical overview of petitioning in the Ottoman 
Empire and the key changes in petitioning practices. We then discuss the King-Crane 
petitions and highlight their differences from traditional petitions, as well as their 
contribution to the emerging national discourse in Greater Syria. We show that petitions 
shifted toward stances that were more ideological and political in nature, a development that 
coincided with the collapse of the Empire. 
 
 
Petitions and Public Opinion 
 
Petitions to authorities, as Christa Hämmerle noted in her work on
 
nineteenth century 
Austria-Hungary, transform “in response to rapidly changing historical conditions”17 and 
respond to changes in zeitgeist.
18
 The nineteenth century also witnessed a gradual shift in the 
nature of Ottoman petitions. This shift was influenced primarily by political developments, 
the introduction of new technologies and means of communication, Ottoman reforms during 
this period, and changing state-subject relations. In the decade between the Young Turk 
Revolution and the end of Abdülhamid’s regime in 1908/9, and the final collapse of the 
                                                 
13 Reimer, “The King–Crane Commission at the Juncture of Politics and Historiography,” 135. 
14
 David Zaret, “Petitions and the ‘Invention’ of Public Opinion in the English Revolution,” American 
Journal of Sociology 101/6 (1996), 1506.  
15 Zaret, “Petitions and the ‘Invention’ of Public Opinion in the English Revolution,” 1506. 
16 Ibid, 1498. 
17
 Christa Hämmerle, “Requests, Complaints, Demands: Preliminary Thoughts on the Petitioning 
Letters of Lower-Class Austrian Women, 1865-1918,” in Bland, Caroline and Máire Cross (eds.), 
Gender and Politics in the Age of Letter-Writing, 1750-2000 (Burlington, VT, 2004), 116.   
18 Hämmerle, “Requests, Complaints, Demands,” 116 (quoting Susanne Ettl). 
New Middle Eastern Studies 4 (2014) 
5 
 
Ottoman Empire in 1918, petitions quickly changed from a traditionally private/confidential 
mode of communication between subjects and ruler into a public “vehicle for political 
messages”. As Zaret points out, whereas “communicative rules for petitioning permitted 
expression of grievance […] only in a restricted form that has little in common with modern 
conceptions of the public sphere as a forum for free and open debate over conflicting political 
goals”19; “[t]he printing of petitions as propaganda not only increased the scope of 
communication but also created novel practices that simultaneously constitute and invoke the 
authority of public opinion in political discourse.”20  
To date, much of the debate regarding the King-Crane petitions has concentrated on 
whether they were a spontaneous expression of indigenous opinion or a product of a centrally 
directed campaign run by the government of Faysal and other interested parties. While Gelvin 
argues that in the King-Crane petitions only the voice of the elite was important,
21
 Reimer 
stresses that “if this had been the case, King-Crane would have pursued a very different 
itinerary than the one that took them to many non-elite communities.”22 Although both points 
of view are important in order to historicize the King-Crane petitions, it is useful to shift the 
focus of discussion beyond this debate. We argue that a textual analysis of these petitions can 
shed light on the transformation of the traditional Ottoman form of appeal into a modern 
political tool used to recruit and generate “public opinion” and foster modern political 
discourse. 
Public opinion is a very elusive term and there is no clear consensual definition. In our 
usage, public opinion is an indicator of “transformations in social structure, economic and 
political reform, and technological advances” of given societies at different times.23 
Moreover, public opinion does not necessarily reflect the will of the people but rather is often 
used by elite groups as leverage to gain legitimacy or to promote ideological or even 
“national” agendas. 
Cengiz Kırlı stresses that “public opinion” in the Ottoman Empire differed in its essence 
and meaning from the Western concept. He argues that there were various kinds of “public 
opinion” in the Empire, all difficult to measure, one of which was information gathered by 
government agents from individual informers in cafés in Istanbul in the mid-nineteenth 
century. Kırlı, moreover, argues that in the Ottoman Empire:  
 
[I]t makes little sense to make a clear-cut distinction between mere opinions and public 
opinion. These mere opinions that Habermas relegated to the “sediment of history” were 
not private exercises but utterances produced in the intimate atmosphere of public 
sociability. Every individual opinion articulated in a public setting incited comment from 
others, then further disseminated through the word of mouth and ultimately contributed 
to the formation of public opinion.
24
 
 
By contrast, we view the notion of “public opinion” in the Ottoman Empire at this time as a 
collective act by a group or several groups of people who were committed or recruited to a 
political cause. In the second half of the nineteenth century, various developments gradually 
enabled the emergence of something more akin to “public opinion” as that term is widely 
                                                 
19
 Ibid, 1517.  
20
 Zaret, “Petitions and the “Invention” of Public Opinion in the English Revolution,” 1502.  
21
 Gelvin, “Ironic Legacy,” 17.  
22
 Reimer, “The King-Crane Commission at the Juncture of Politics and Historiography,” 135.  
23 Susan Herbst, “On the Disappearance of Groups: 19th and Early 20th-Century Conceptions of Public 
Opinion,” in Glasser, Theodore L. and Charles T. Salmon (eds.), Public Opinion and the 
Communication of Consent (New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1995), 92. 
24 See Cengiz Kırlı, “Coffeehouses: Public Opinion in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire,” in 
Salvatore, Armando and Dale Eickelman (eds.), Public Islam and the Common Good, 95-96.  
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understood today. These developments included the spread of journalism, growing literacy, 
the penetration of Western ideas and concepts, the changing status of the Empire’s subjects 
and their more rapid channels of communication with the imperial center, and finally the 
short-lived experiment in parliamentary life and constitutionalism. 
Alongside these developments, the traditional familiar institution of petitions 
constituted a mechanism which could help take the pulse of the masses in the Empire and 
measure the subjects’ mood. For example, arz-i mahzar, the traditional mass petition, 
morphed in the nineteenth century into a tool to express urban politics and schisms and hence 
came to reflect a type of “public opinion”, as discussed below. Hence, even though the main 
role of petitions was not to evaluate “public opinion”, changes occurring during the 
nineteenth century turned them into a potent vehicle for this task. The King-Crane petitions, 
which differed from traditional Ottoman petitions, contributed to the emerging national 
discourse in Greater Syria and to what became an experiment in “public opinion”. 
 
Traditional Modes of Petitioning prior to the Nineteenth Century 
 
The institution of petitioning the Ottoman Sultan by the Empire’s subjects had very deep 
historical roots which went back as far as the Empire’s early centuries.25 This institution was 
not a unique Ottoman or Islamic invention but has existed in other societies since writing was 
invented,
 26
although in the Islamic world it took on its own special characteristics. 
Petitions to the ruler enabled subjects to “let off steam”, feel that someone was attuned 
to their distress and suffering, and appeal personally to the ruler, which was otherwise 
impossible given the unbalanced power relationship between them. For rulers it was an 
efficient way to keep an eye on developments in their domains, maintain open channels of 
direct communication with the masses, and monitor the activity of the bureaucracy. The 
institution of petitioning, moreover, allowed absolute rulers to divert criticism and possible 
anger and frustration away from them in cases of corruption, misbehavior, misdeeds, and 
immoral behavior while laying the blame on the group of intermediaries between the masses 
and the throne. Finally, it served as a mechanism that contributed to the rulers’ image as just 
and benevolent sovereigns who cared about the security and well-being of their subjects. In 
the Islamic world these notions were part of the “circle of equity”, an important concept 
dominating the political sphere which was adopted from pre-Islamic societies.
27
 
Despite clear differences from the “classical” Islamic institution of the mazalim courts, 
the Ottomans inherited this tradition and the institution of petitioning the ruler. They made 
broad use of it at both the provincial and imperial levels. As the head of the state, the source 
of its legitimacy and the embodiment of its just rule, the Sultan was always willing to accept 
petitions from commoners.
28
 Other than being an important tool for the Sultans to gain 
                                                 
25
 For instance, see Suraiya Faroqhi, “Political Initiatives ‘From the Bottom Up’ in the Sixteenth- and 
Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Empire: Some Evidence for Their Existence,” in Faroqhi, Suraiya 
(ed.), Coping with the State: Political Conflict and Crime in the Ottoman Empire, 1550-1720 
(Istanbul: Isis Press, 1995), 1-11; Eyal Ginio, “Patronage, Intervention and Violence in the Legal 
Process in Eighteenth-Century Salonica and Its Province,” in Ron Shaham (ed.), Law, Custom, and 
Statute in the Muslim World (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 111-130. 
26
 For example, on petitions sent by native populations in the British Commonwealth, see Ravi De 
Costa, “Identity, Authority, and the Moral Worlds of Indigenous Petitions,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 48/3 (2006), 669-698. 
27 Linda Darling, A History of Social Justice and Political Power in the Middle East: The Circle of 
Justice from Mesopotamia to Globalization (London: Routledge, 2013), 1-8. 
28
 For a nuanced view of the Ottoman concept of “justice,” see Boğaç A. Ergene, “On Ottoman 
Justice: Interpretations in Conflict (1600-1800),” Islamic Law and Society 8/1 (2001), 52-87. 
Enforcement of justice in the Ottoman Empire was one of the cornerstones of legitimacy and order. It 
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legitimacy
29
 and to strengthen their image as just and benevolent Islamic rulers, the workings 
of this institution were consistent with the structure of the Ottoman Empire as a patrimonial 
society, in which the Sultan was considered the “father” of his subjects and constituted the 
authority personally responsible for their welfare.
30
 Subjects could send a petition to the 
imperial center through the kadı of a nearby town or ask a representative or delegation to 
travel to Istanbul to submit the petition in person.
31
 At times, petitions could also be 
submitted to the governor of a province who held special mazalim sessions similar to these 
held at the imperial level but on a local level, with the participation of the local kadı.32 
Theoretically (and often in practice as well), every Ottoman subject, even the simplest 
peasant in the most remote province, had the right to submit a petition to the Sultan and beg 
for justice, in person, through a representative, or by sending a petition.
33
 The Imperial 
Council (Divan-ı Hümayun), discussed the complaints.34 Sending a representative or a 
delegation to Istanbul to submit a petition was a complicated and expensive process, given 
the barriers of geography, the situation on the roads, and the means of transportation. Not 
surprisingly, in many cases petitions were written in the name of a group of people and not by 
individuals who sought to promote their own specific interests. Beyond reducing the costs 
involved, it was often assumed that a collective approach would be better received in Istanbul 
and had a better chance of leading to results for the petitioners. Appearance in person at the 
Sultan’s court was easier for people with considerable means at their disposal or for people 
who lived relatively close to Istanbul.
35
 
Thus, prior to the nineteenth century the commonly used institution of petitioning the 
Sultan was conducted and constructed in a very restricted way which represented norms of 
secrecy between ruler and ruled (even though many of the petitions were collective). Its main 
usage was to complain about injustice and abuse of power by officials and low to middle rank 
bureaucrats. Its political overtones - though definitely present
36
- were subtle and indirect and 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
was meant to protect the subjects, the reaya, from abuse of power and exploitation, i.e. preventing 
zulm in the first place. Ottoman justice had a dual nature. The sultans and the administration were 
obliged to govern according to the shariʿa, but at the same time the sultans themselves were the 
embodiment of justice and functioned as last and supreme resort of justice through the institution of 
petitioning. The enforcement of justice was believed to please God’s will. 
29
 In this regard, Gottfried Hagen writes that legitimacy is “the result of continuous negotiation 
between ruler and ruled”, a remark which might explain the importance of the petitioning system to 
both the urban elite and the Empire in the period discussed here. See Gottfried Hagen, “Legitimacy 
and World Order,” in Karateke, Hakan T. and Maurus Reinkowski (eds.), Legitimizing the Order: The 
Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005), 55; Hakan T. Karateke, 
“Legitimizing the Ottoman Sultanate: A Framework for Historical Analysis,” Legitimizing the Order: 
The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power, pp. 13-52. 
30
 Şerif Mardin, “Power, Civil Society, and Culture in the Ottoman Empire,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 11 (1969), 260. 
31
 Faroqhi, “Political Initiatives ‘From the Bottom Up’,” 10. 
32
 For instance, see Michael Ursinus, Grievance Administration (Şikayet) in an Ottoman Province: 
The Kaymakam of Rumelia’s ʽRecord Book of Complaints’ of 1781-1783 (London and New-York: 
Routledge, 2005), 37. 
33
 Suraiya Faroqhi, “Political Activity among Ottoman Taxpayers and the Problem of Sultanic 
Legitimation (1570-1650),” Coping with the State, 14 (“the Ottoman political system rested on the 
premise that anyone, man or woman, might turn to the ruler to ask for a redress of grievances”). 
34
 Uriel Heyd, Ottoman Documents on Palestine, 1552-1615: A Study of the Firman according to the 
Mühimme Defteri (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 14.   
35
 Faroqhi, “Political Activity among Ottoman Taxpayers,” 14. 
36
 Faroqhi, Suraiya, “Introduction,” Coping with the State, xv. 
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the institution’s rules were upheld and preserved by both sides. These dynamics gradually 
changed as a result of the reforms of the nineteenth century and the need to adapt petitions to 
the zeitgeist.  
 
Changes in the Nineteenth Century 
 
The massive reforms and efforts at modernization in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth 
century gradually endowed it with many of the characteristics of a modern bureaucratic state, 
despite the lingering effects of the previous patrimonial system. Under such circumstances, it 
would make sense to assume that the traditional institution of petitioning the ruler would lose 
its importance and give way to other more modern and regularized means of pursuing justice 
and redress from the state, its representatives and institutions.
37
 These reforms included the 
establishment of nizamiye courts with several tiers of appeal in the Empire’s provinces and 
their differentiation from the shariʿa courts, the codification of Muslim religious law starting 
in 1869 and throughout the 1870s (the Mecelle), the introduction of several European-
inspired legal codes, the establishment of modern-styled state ministries, the setting up of 
administrative councils in the provinces in several instances, and even the short-lived 
parliament and constitution of the mid-1870s. 
Nevertheless, numerous petitions were still sent to Istanbul from the provinces during 
this period and petitions became a tool to conduct politics vis-à-vis the central government, 
especially as regards the urban populations in the Empire’s provinces.38 Hence, the institution 
of petitioning the Ottoman ruler did not lose its relevance, but rather took on new importance 
and went through a process of transformation. In part, this process was assisted and facilitated 
by new technologies and means of communication (i.e., postal services and the telegraph) 
which reduced to a minimum the limitations of geography and physical barriers and enabled 
every Ottoman subject to contact Istanbul quickly and relatively cheaply in order to demand 
redress, a process which previously had been much harder physically and had required great 
efforts and means. 
Another factor was the more centralized nature of the state headed by the Sultan, which 
was perceived by the subjects as the addressee of their complaints. The changing state-subject 
relationships and the state’s growing interference in its subjects’ lives also played an 
important role. The state regulated a growing number of aspects of people’s daily lives and 
introduced reforms which undermined previous habits, norms and practices in areas as varied 
as tax collection, registration of land, conscription, censuses, policing, health and the like. As 
such, many more people had a reason to make complaints in relation to which they perceived 
the state headed by the Sultan as the addressee. 
Petitions were thus sent to the imperial center concerning almost every issue affecting 
the local population, large or small, instead of going through other legal and administrative 
channels. In part this was motivated by the petitioners’ hope to leverage their advantages in 
                                                 
37
 The fact that there are no major works dealing with petitions to the Sultan from the nineteenth 
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38
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existing arguments and conflicts. The large number of petitions may however have also 
stemmed from the growing labyrinth of Ottoman institutions which confused the subjects, 
who preferred to utilize an institution they were familiar with. Another reason was the high 
fees demanded in other judicial institutions such as the nizamiye courts, in which cases also 
required the hiring of attorneys.
39
 Finally, the various reforms and the changes they brought 
about also prompted individual subjects and collectives to attempt to preserve their former 
rights, privileges and exemptions which they had acquired over the years with or without 
official sanctions. 
At the same time, as part of the Sultans’ endeavor to maintain their legitimacy in the 
face of growing bureaucratic intervention in the everyday life of their subjects, the 
mechanism of petitioning was used as a way to sustain the Sultan’s image as the benevolent 
father of his subjects. Petitions were perceived as an efficient mechanism to create an image 
of a caring and protective ruler who could be reached personally and who tried to mitigate the 
hardships of his subjects, whose concerns were allegedly at the top of his agenda. 
Finally, the personality of certain Sultans such as Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909), an 
autocrat who was known to be highly suspicious and who ruled in a centralized manner, is 
another factor to be considered with regard to the multiplication of petitions and the 
continued relevance of the institution of appealing to the ruler.
40
 As part of the paternalistic 
attitude of Abdülhamid II and his attempt to boost his image as the father of his subjects, he 
even established a special department (Maruzat-ı Rikabiye Dairesi) to handle the petitions 
submitted to him.
41
 
The massive number of petitions from the provinces to the center in Istanbul must be 
considered in light of the transformations and developments discussed above. To cite one 
example, landowners in the region of the town of Jaffa in Palestine’s central coast, which 
belonged to the mutasarrıflık of Jerusalem, were preoccupied for several years with an issue 
that led to considerable lingering tension with the central government. At stake were miri 
(state-owned) lands in the town’s immediate environment which over the years had gradually 
come to be seen as mülk (privately owned) land, a step which was unlawfully accepted by 
local Ottoman officials and was concretized when these lands were bought and sold, as well 
as in the type of taxes levied on the owners of these lands. The conflict was triggered when 
the state took steps to revert the classification of these lands to their original status as part of 
its effort to reorganize the tax collection and the register lands over the names of their 
holders. 
In a massive petition sent in July 1891 by 58 Muslim and Christian landowners from 
Jaffa to the Grand Vizier, the government’s decision to treat the land of Jaffa as mülk rather 
than as miri was contested. The petition argued that the supervisor of Defter-i Hakanî (the 
Ottoman imperial register of land revenues) in Beirut, Zekati Efendi, ordered the tapu (the 
                                                 
39 Avi Rubin, Ottoman Nizamiye Courts: Law and Modernity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 
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40
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Ottoman land registration bureau) official in Jaffa to change existing policy with regards to 
Jaffa’s lands, a step which the petitioners claimed was illegal, violated Islamic laws of 
inheritance, and negated the accepted practice approved by past rulers.
42
 A few months later 
another mass petition, signed by Jaffa’s Nakibüleşraf and thirty-eight other people was sent to 
the Grand Vizier, arguing that the same Zekati Efendi had initiated a new land survey in Jaffa 
as part of a plan to carry out a programme of land reform. The petitioners stressed again that 
they had documentary proof that they legally owned the land in Jaffa and that the survey was 
illegal in their eyes.
43
 
These two petitions sent from Jaffa by groups with shared interests who strove to 
preserve their former rights vis-à-vis the Ottoman authorities demonstrate the changing 
nature of petitions in the nineteenth century. As argued above, the use of petitions had always 
contained a kernel of political activity. However, the coming together of dozens of members 
of Jaffa’s elite in an attempt to repeal policies and plans promoted by state officials can be 
seen as a precursor of what Zaret terms a violation of “traditional restrictions on the 
expression of grievance in petitions”.44 Compared with past practices, the tone of their 
petition was rather argumentative. They questioned state policies, argued with their 
implementation and challenged their rationale. Nonetheless, they did so only with regards to 
local administrative matters directly influencing the petitioners and their region, and not 
beyond. In their own words: 
 
It is known, based on jurisprudence, that a person does not have to prove ownership over 
something which he possesses or prove the way in which he received it…Hence we ask 
for the issuance of an imperial order which will forbid unfair treatment of our property, 
something which does not correspond to the religious and nizami laws, both of which are 
the sources of the rulership’s continuation [madar qawm al-mulk] and the preservation 
of public order and the people’s well being.
45
 
 
Another new feature of petitions to Istanbul in the second half of the
 
nineteenth century 
is that they became a tool in the hands of the provincial urban populations to conduct local 
politics vis-à-vis the imperial center, rather than serving primarily as a judicial mechanism to 
complain about injustices, wrongdoing, and misconduct by the low-ranking Ottoman 
bureaucracy and the administration. Coalitions of notables signed numerous petitions in 
support of candidates for certain positions and against their rivals, to complain about the 
conduct of members of rival coalitions, request to upgrade or change the status of their city, 
or preserve traditional privileges, rights, and concessions. For example, in the town of Gaza 
in the southern part of the mutasarrıflık of Jerusalem, urban coalitions sent numerous 
petitions against each other from the 1870s to the 1890s. In one case, “Islamic jurists, the 
muhtar, respected elders and notables from Gaza” sent a joint petition to protest the practices 
of the mufti of Gaza at the time, Ahmad Muhyi al-Din Efendi, of the Husayni family. They 
argued that he had oppressed the people and exhibited poor conduct, and demanded that he 
should be replaced by Muhammad Saqallah who was “a respectful and honest man.”46 
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 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Prime Minister Ottoman Archive, henceforth BOA), Hariciye 
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The opposing group counterattacked with a petition sent some months later, signed by 
nineteen “Islamic jurists and notables”, which asked the government to dismiss mufti 
Muhammad Saqallah for lack of religious knowledge and general incompetence. They 
claimed that they had already presented the issue and demanded the reinstatement of Ahmad 
Muhyi al-Din Efendi to the post of mufti.
47 
The new mufti himself applied to the Sadaret to 
examine allegations against him which appeared in the newspaper al-Jawa’ib, and demanded 
a government inquiry into the running of this newspaper, hinting that the preceding mufti and 
his supporters were behind this publication.
48
 
Thus in the nineteenth century petitions increasingly served as a political intermediary 
of sorts for some segments of the population - urbanites in particular - rather than for 
complaints about injustices or abuse of power, as had been the case in the traditional 
institution of petitioning. Yet despite this difference from traditional complaints, the 
collective petitions still represented specific groups within society. They were not motivated 
by ideology or an agenda which provided a common denominator for wider segments. A 
major boost in the transformation from traditional petitioning to modern practices of 
petitioning occurred after the introduction of a parliamentary regime in 1908, when the Sultan 
ceased to be the addressee for complaints and actual power was no longer in his hands. 
 
Changes in the Decade between 1908 and 1918 
 
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the abolishment of Abdülhamid’s censorship were 
accompanied by the reinstatement of parliamentary life, the enactment of the postponed 
constitution of 1876, and the lifting of the ban on free press and political activity. All these 
developments brought about important changes in the nature of petitions.
49
 At this point, 
Sultans became only figureheads and held little actual power. Thus, whereas the past 
petitions had been referred to the Sultan and had been seen as a tool to obtain his benevolence 
and mercy while granting him much needed legitimacy, now they were mainly addressed to 
the Council of State, the Parliament, and the different Ministries to obtain political rights, 
preserve privileges vis-à-vis other groups in society and within groups, and ensure civil 
equity and constitutional rights. Hence, the discourse shifted to focus on constitutional and 
civil rights, the rule of law, and the defects of the former system. It was only natural that the 
familiar institution of petitioning would serve as a medium through which new discourses 
were negotiated. In other words, as the political reality changed, so did the petitions. 
A case in point concerns the village of Masmiyya, some twenty-five kilometers 
northeast of Gaza in the kaza (sub-district) bearing the same name, and the Bedouin group of 
al-Wuhaydat, who were both fighting over land known as al-Mukhayzin. The conflict led to a 
trial and the submission of dozens of petitions to Istanbul by both parties, though particularly 
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by the villagers. Briefly, the villagers claimed that they had cultivated the land for hundreds 
of years whereas the Bedouins had taken possession of it illegally during the reign of Sultan 
Abdülhamid II (1876-1908/9). The Bedouins were accused of having obtained illegal title 
deeds for the land through their connections in Gaza, which prompted the villagers to take the 
matter to court. Interestingly, the villagers’ petitions castigated the Abdülhamid era using a 
new discourse characteristic of the post-Hamidian period, a decision which was doubtless 
motivated by flattery. The petitions framed the previous era as one of darkness and tyranny, 
whereas the new post-Revolution era was described as the dawn of a new age.
50
 
This case is illustrative of the transformation from justice through ad hoc Sultanic 
prerogative to constitutional and civil law. The petitions make a novel reference to 
constitutional rights, equity, the new age in the Empire’s history, and the subjects’ right to be 
protected by the rule of law.
51
 As pointed out by Michelle Campos in her analysis of the 
changing discourse among the Empire’s subjects in the period after the Revolution, “Ottoman 
citizens studied and cited the constitution and other revolutionary ‘sacred texts’ that endowed 
them with political power, and they utilized a variety of tools to exercise and preserve that 
power.”52 Given that the Bedouins and villagers in question were most probably illiterate and 
could not have written such complicated texts alone, it is likely that their petitions were 
written by arzuhalciler (public scribes who wrote petitions and letters) who used the 
discourse, language and vocabulary circulating in the urban milieus to express their clients’ 
views. 
Some petitions during this period were even published in the press that mushroomed in 
the Levant in the aftermath of the Revolution, a phenomenon which for the most part had not 
been possible in the previous era.
53
 Although such messages in the public sphere still 
expressed support for the Ottoman Empire, this was another departure from the traditional 
mode of secrecy toward a means of enlisting and generating public opinion. Nonetheless, the 
people’s recruitment to stand behind certain ideas which appeared in the printed press was 
still rather limited and passive. After so many years of political oppression, censorship, lack 
of free press, and inability to organize on a political basis this was almost inevitable. In 
addition, literacy rates were still very low, there was no developed tradition of civil activity, 
and the overarching notion of pan-Islamic ideology during the times of Abdülhamid II 
hindered mobilization in the name of competing ideologies. Moreover, the regime in the 
Empire in 1913 which was led by the Committee of Union and Progress manifested very little 
patience with any kind of political and ideological activity or acts of civil disobedience. In the 
King-Crane petitions, on the other hand, there was more active participation, as well as mass 
recruitment of a range of signatories from different places and backgrounds. It was only then 
that the full-scale transformation of petitions – including a transformation in their structure – 
took place, turning them into a modern political instrument representing the emergence of 
mass politics. 
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Petitions in the Service of Ideology: Towards Modern Public Opinion? 
 
In a situation in which there was neither a Sultan nor an Empire, the more or less unified 
construction of traditional petitions which had prevailed until this time splintered into many 
variants. The ability to submit petitions more freely made it possible to promote national, 
civic and patriotic agendas, notions and ideas, and to use ideology as a common denominator 
between members of different groups. Once again, the petitions reflected changing historical 
conditions and the shifting zeitgeist. 
The petitions submitted to the King-Crane Commission (at least those obtainable at 
various archives) are mostly collective and very few are personal. At first glance the King-
Crane petitions appear similar to the traditional Ottoman arz-i mahzar. However, a thorough 
examination reveals major changes both in the structure and in the content of these petitions. 
Before discussing some general characteristics of the King-Crane petitions, it will be worth 
quoting at length from one example: 
 
Demands of the people of the Province of Halab
54
 
1. We demand complete political independence without tutelage and protection in the 
region extending from the Taurus Mountains in the north, Aqaba in the south, the 
River Euphrates in the East until its termination (Abu-Kamal), and in the west the 
Mediterranean Sea.  
2. We demand that the government of this Syrian land be under a monarch [mulkiyya], 
with a civilian [madaniyya] representative regime which will include its provinces in a 
widely decentralized manner and will be protected in its domains under his honorable 
Emir Faysal.  
3. We protest against article 22 of the Convention of the League of Nations which 
imposes upon us a state [mandate], and if this protest is not accepted, we will consider 
the issue of mandatory rule as a manifestation of scientific and economic aid which is 
not connected to our complete independence. 
4. We ask for the help mentioned above from the US. 
5. If the United States refuses our demands, we will demand the above mentioned help 
from England in the framework of previous conditions. 
6. We refuse help from France under any circumstances, and we will not recognize any 
of the rights [hukuk] which it calls for in any part of our country. 
7. We refuse the demands of the Zionists who turn Palestine into their national home and 
we refuse that they will immigrate there. 
8. We demand that Palestine and the western coastal region, including Lebanon which is 
part of Syria should not be divided. We demand to keep the unity of the country and 
not to accept any kind of division under any circumstances… 
[…] 
10. We protest in the strongest possible way against any agreement that divides our 
country Syria… 
 
One of the most important features in the King-Crane petitions was the wide-scale circulation 
of printed formulaic petitions which previously had been very rare (see Appendix 2).
55
 
Ottoman petitions were for the most part handwritten, usually with the help of arzuhalciler, 
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professional petition and letter writers. Now printing was widely used for “parrot 
petitioning”56 i.e., the production of messages with almost identical wording which only 
required the petitioner’s signature. Such petitions, which were widely circulated, had not 
been available during the Ottoman era. The closest equivalent at the time had been the 
repeated submission of similar petitions by the same petitioners. 
This led to the submission of identical petitions with high numbers of signatories. Such 
petitions were less diversified than in earlier eras, when each petition had been unique in 
some way (despite the widespread availability of manuals for writing petitions and the 
formulaic way in which they were written).
57
 
Signature campaigns were mounted to collect the names of large numbers of people on 
a given petition. Thus, while the average number of signatures on petitions submitted to the 
King-Crane Commission was 49, some petitions had thousands of signatures. In total more 
than 91,000 signatures were collected for petitions submitted to the Commission.
58
 Although 
the submission of collective petitions was not new, the number of signatures on these 
petitions, the submission of similar petitions from different regions, and the quantity of 
collective petitions may all have helped to create an imagined community and a shared sense 
of identity between people of different localities. 
Compared to past practices, there were also considerable changes with regard to the 
way signatures were presented and how the petitions were signed. For example, in many 
petitions the signatures are divided hierarchically into a group of notables followed by the 
signatures of numerous people who authorized the notables to act in their name, a structure 
which resembles a legal document (see Appendix 2.2). This apparently gave the document 
more political weight and the appearance of being the act of an organized representative body 
which speaks in the name of different segments of society, both the elite and the common 
people. Ottoman petitions had not been presented in such a way, although there had been a 
tendency to put dignitaries such as the local Nakibüleşraf at the top of the list. 
Another innovation was the appearance of stamped signatures without the petitioners’ 
details (see Appendix 3), or people’s signatures that appeared individually without a seal (see 
Appendices 4 and 5). Previously, petitioners had usually signed with their personal seal 
which incorporated their name in a stylistic manner, and their title was specified by the 
petition-writer (e.g., first muhtar of a certain village, etc.). Signatures without seals had 
appeared during the Ottoman era for the most part only in telegraphs. Possibly the current 
inclusion of seals was done to inflate the number of petitioners and to give the petition extra 
weight (see Appendix 1). At the same time, these stylistic development were designed to give 
petitions a more authentic and representative appearance. People’s names became the main 
voice in petitioning rather than having mediators speak for them (muhtarlar, sheikhs, and 
other notables). This may reflect process of pluralism in petitioning practices, which is 
indicative of the changing dynamics of a civil society in the making. This change in the 
petitions shows the departure from an imperial mode of petitioning to a more plural and less 
restrictive mode. One of its consequences was the ability to speak in the name of a national 
ideology. 
The King-Crane petitions also echoed the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire and the 
growing room for maneuver enjoyed by petitioners. The petitions were now addressed to an 
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outside foreign audience rather than to the imperial regime. For example, given that the 
empire had collapsed, petitions were no longer written on paper bearing the imperial stamp 
tax. This suggests that many of the petitions were not written by arzuhalciler in accordance 
with traditional patterns but were rather formulated more freely by members of the educated 
elite, who broke with traditional patterns of writing, before often being reproduced and 
duplicated. Hence, there was now more than one style of petition writing. 
In terms of their content, the King-Crane petitions once again diverged considerably 
from earlier petitions. In the past, petitions had been much more formulaic and adhered to 
very strict modes of expression and codes of flattery. Within the King-Crane petitions, in 
contrast, there are considerable differences in eloquence and style across the various 
documents.
59
 Many of the King-Crane petitions start with headers which define their content, 
such as “the demands of the residents of the district of Halab” (see Appendix 2). The 
structure of many other petitions resembles a modern legal document, with articles stipulating 
demands presented below the title. Other innovations include the use of formulas such as “we 
the undersigned..,” and the word ‘statement’ at times appears above the demands. Moreover, 
the tone of many petitions was a demand rather than a plea or flattery (“we demand,” “we 
refuse,” “we object”) (see Appendix 4). Occasionally, there are also cases of letters written in 
a personal style by individuals making various requests, suggestions and complaints.  
All of these modes of expression would have been unimaginable in approaches to the 
Sultan and the imperial center, where petitioners deliberately affected to assume a humble 
posture and beg for the ruler’s mercy. Moreover, the type of justice now demanded was a fair 
political arrangement - as each group of petitioners understood it - rather than justice from the 
ruler achieved by eliminating abuse, malpractice or corruption. 
Finally, many of the petitions were submitted by representatives of societies, clubs, 
organizations and parties (al-Nadi al-ʿArabi, Jamʿiyyat al-ʿUmmal, Hizb al-ʿAhd, the New 
Syria National League) and not by muhtars of villages and neighborhoods, sheikhs, or 
masters of guilds, as had been the case during the Ottoman era. This tends to confirm 
Howard’s suggestion that there was now a wider base of participation, including new players 
representing different groups in society above the local level.
60
 Forerunners of this 
phenomenon were seen during the years after the Young Turk Revolution but not of this 
magnitude. 
Thus overall, the King-Crane petitions reveal political maneuvering and initiatives as 
well as the emergence of a civil discourse on the part of the elite. They differed from 
traditional petitions in their addressees, initiators, form, structure, demands and mode of 
submission. Moreover, they were based on political and ideological considerations, demands, 
and arguments, unlike past petitions which had been addressed to the Sultan. The more the 
demands and the justifications appearing in the King-Crane petitions were coherent and 
consistent, the more likely that they were initiated by interested parties such as Faysal’s 
constituents to boost the legitimacy of their claims vis-à-vis the Commission. Faysal’s 
supporters, for instance, used various tactics and maneuvering to collect signatures on pre-
planned petitions as an effective tool to enhance his legitimacy and image as representative 
and protector of the public. Although these petitions did not represent the ‘true’ voice of 
‘public opinion,’ they are significant in their attempts to promote a political cross-regional 
ideology. 
 
 
                                                 
59 It should be noted that telegraphs - unlike letters - were already less formulaic during the Ottoman 
period. This was due to the need for conciseness, since charges were levied per word. 
60
 Howard, The King-Crane Commission, 143.   
New Middle Eastern Studies 4 (2014) 
16 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article described the ways in which petitioning in Ottoman Syria evolved from a 
traditional vehicle reflecting norms of secrecy between a ruler and his subjects into a political 
tactic that reflecting larger cross-regional campaigns. The flexibility and fluidity of petitions 
illustrates adaptation to existing political circumstances and prevalent social structures, as 
well as people’s growing ability to read and write. 
Textual analysis of the King-Crane petitions sheds light on the transformation of the 
traditional Ottoman form of appeal into a modern political tool, used to recruit and generate 
public opinion and foster a modern political collective discourse in the post-Ottoman era. The 
petitions addressed to the King-Crane Commission represented a new experience for the 
masses and the elite, which involved a process of reimagining and reconfiguring their 
collective. The destruction of the Ottoman Empire as a political entity, the meddling of the 
Great Powers in the affairs of Greater Syria, and attempts by the local people to forge new 
political and social structures all paved the way for a transformation of the institution of 
petitioning into a political tool. The act of organizing and submitting petitions motivated by 
ideological considerations had an enormous impact on Syrian society. Even though collective 
petitioning campaigns were orchestrated by the elite, educating the people to join in this 
endeavor gave them a taste of what it was like to take part in modern political expression.
61
 
Thus the King-Crane petitions helped advance the political imagination of a Syrian 
entity, a process which was highly significant for the national development of modern Syria. 
Petitions played a key role in this process, even though they did not always ‘authentically’ 
represent the aspirations of the masses. They helped to consolidate a political discourse 
grounded in reference to a Syrian national sphere. They may also have served to bridge the 
transformation from Ottoman rule to the establishment of a modern national Arab state in 
Syria between 1918 and 1920. 
Recent research on petitioning practices in the newly established Turkish Republic of 
the 1920s indicates that “[p]etitioning mediated between political elites’ need for political 
legitimacy and people’s concerns regarding their social, political, and economic 
experiences.”62 Petitions were an important tool that enabled people to negotiate “political, 
social, and ideological transformations taking place at this formative historical juncture.”63 In 
future research, scholars should thoroughly examine petitions not only as separate case 
studies but rather across time and space. The changing nature of petitions and their flexibility 
in response to shifting contexts demonstrates that they constitute an important archival source 
for identifying social, political and conceptual transformations which occurred within the 
Ottoman Empire and in its former Arab provinces in the post-Ottoman era. 
                                                 
61
 Gelvin, Divided Loyalties, 35.  
62
 Yiğit Akın, “Reconsidering State, Party, and Society in Early Republican Turkey: Politics of 
Petitioning,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 39 (2007), 442.  
63
 Akın, “Reconsidering State, Party, and Society in Early Republican Turkey,” 449. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1:  
The King-Crane Commission’s Reservations regarding the Petitions it received 
 
Source:  
The Internet Archive, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080526055304/http://www.ipcri.org/files/kingcrane.html 
(last accessed on 11.02.14). 
 
“SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT CONCLUSIONS 
 
I. The Value of the Petitions as an Estimate of Public Opinion in Syria: 
 
The 1863 petitions received by the American Commission in Syria and the summary tables 
prepared from them cannot of course be regarded as a mathematically accurate analysis of the 
real desires of the peoples of Syria. There are at least five unavoidable difficulties that have 
qualified their accuracy. 
 
1. The number of the petitions from the different sections of Syria is not proportional to their 
respective populations, e. g., O. E T. A. [Note: These initials stand for “Occupied Enemy 
Territory Administration,” but are commonly used as a word, “Oeta,” as “British Oeta,” 
“French Oeta,” or “Arab Oeta.”] South, with thirteen cities at which delegations were 
received is represented by only 260 petitions, while 1,157 petitions were received from O. E 
T. A. East, in which but eight cities were visited. As the Commission progressed northward 
the petitions became more numerous, due to the increased time afforded for knowledge of the 
Commission’s coming, for the preparation of petitions, for the activities of propaganda 
agents, and for the natural crystallization of public opinion.  
2. The number of petitions from the different religious organizations is not proportional to the 
numerical strength of the religious faiths. This Is especially true of the verbal requests made 
by delegations. In O. E. T. A. South, for instance, on account of the number of sects of the 
Christian faith, 53 delegations of Christians were received, and only eighteen delegations of 
Moslems, whereas the Moslem population is fully eight times as large as that of the Christian. 
This disparity does not, however, hold for the total number of petitions, verbal and written, as 
it was corrected in part by the large number of petitions from Moslem villages presented to 
the Commission at Aleppo and other northeastern points.  
3. A number of petitions show clearly the influence of organized propaganda. This is sometimes 
evidenced in the petitions themselves by numerous similarities of phrasing, by many identical 
wordings, and by a few instances in which printed forms, obviously intended as models for 
written documents, have been signed and given to the Commission. In addition to the internal 
evidence, there were also many external indications of systematic efforts to influence the 
character of the petitions. The same Arab agent was observed in four cities of Palestine, 
assisting in the preparation of petitions. Similar activities on the part of French sympathizers 
were observed In Beirut.  
4. In addition to this general propaganda, which was entirely legitimate as well as natural and 
inevitable, it is certain that a small number of petitions were fraudulently secured. In two 
cases the signatures were in the same handwriting. Three instances of “repeater” signatures 
were discovered. In addition, the seals of new organizations, purporting to be Trade Unions 
of Beirut, were discovered to have been ordered by the same propaganda agent a few days 
before the arrival of the Commission. All possible precautions were taken to insure 
authenticity of petitions and signatures, but in view of the character of the Commission’s 
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survey and the limited facilities for close checking, the genuineness of all cannot be 
guaranteed.  
5. The value of the individual petitions varies also with the number of signatures, although mere 
numbers cannot be taken as the only criterion. For example, some petitions signed by only a 
small Municipal Council may represent a larger public opinion than a petition signed by a 
thousand villagers. The number of signatures is 91,079;* 26,324 for the Petitions of O. E. T. 
A. South, 26,884 for the Petitions of O. E. T. A West, and 37,871 for the Petitions of O. E. T. 
A. East. This represents a general average of 49 signatures for each petition. The number of 
signatures varies widely from this average, but the totals for the different programs are fairly 
well equalized. 
 
Yet despite these five qualifications, it is believed that the petitions as summarized present a 
fairly accurate analysis of present political opinion in Syria. The great majority of irregularities 
offset one another. The preponderance of Christian petitions in Palestine is balanced by the flood 
of Moslem appeals at Aleppo. The activities of French sympathizers in Tripoli probably did not 
influence the character of the petitions presented much more than the contrary efforts of the 
Independent Program representatives in Amman.  
 The petitions are certainly representative. As the classified list of delegations received by the 
Commission clearly indicates, the petitions came front a wide range of political, economic, 
social, and religious classes and organizations. It was generally known throughout Syria that the 
American Commission would receive in confidence any documents that any individual or group 
should care to present. In the few cities in which the military authorities sought to exert control, 
directly or indirectly, over the delegations, without exception the opposition parties found 
opportunities to present their ideas to the Commission, if not always orally, at least in writing.  
 
*NOTE: These figures indicate the magnitude of the popular interest in the Commission’s work 
and the vast amount of material it had to handle. The reader should again be reminded that “O. E. 
T. A. South” was British, or Palestine, “O. E. T. A. West” was French, or Syrian; “O. E. T. A. 
East” was Arab, and “O. E. T. A. North” was French.”  
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Appendix 2: 
A Typewritten Mass Petition from Aleppo (taken from the Lybyer Papers, University of Illinois) 
 
Source:  
The King-Crane Commission Digital Collection, Oberlin College Archives, 
http://dcollections.oberlin.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/kingcrane/id/2088/rec/20 (last 
accessed on 14.02.14). 
  
Note the demands raised by the “people of the Province of Halab”. Such printed petitions were 
widely circulated by interested parties who collected signatures, and became “parrot petitions”. 
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Appendix 2.2: 
The Signatures attached to the Mass Petition from Allepo (taken from the Lybyer Papers, 
University of Illinois)  
 
Source:  
The King-Crane Commission Digital Collection, Oberlin College Archives, 
http://dcollections.oberlin.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/kingcrane/id/2088/rec/20 (last 
accessed on 14.02.14). 
 
Note how the signatures are divided hierarchically into a group of notables followed by 
signatures of people who authorized the notables to act in their name, a structure which 
resembles a legal document. The signatures themselves resemble signatures on mass petitions 
(arz-i mahzar) during the Ottoman period, in that they have a seal bearing the names of the 
petitioners (from amongst the notables) as well as their title.  
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Appendix 3: 
Signatures in the Form of Seals without Additional Writing Affixed to a Mass Petition by al-Nadi 
al-Arabi )the Arab Society) in Amman (taken from King Papers, Oberlin College Archives) 
 
Source: 
The King-Crane Commission Digital Collection, Oberlin College Archives, 
http://dcollections.oberlin.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/kingcrane/id/552/rec/1http:/dcolle
ctions.oberlin.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/kingcrane/id/552/rec/1 (last accessed on 
14.02.14). 
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Appendix 4: 
A Mass Petition by the Grocers of Tripoli (taken from the Lybyer Papers, University of Illinois)
  
Source:  
The King-Crane Commission Digital Collection, Oberlin College Archives, 
http://dcollections.oberlin.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/kingcrane/id/2153/rec/46 (last 
accessed on 14.02.14). 
 
Note the asssertive tone of the petition that lists the grocers’ demands  
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Appendix 5: 
A Petition by the Ashrafs of Beirut to Protest a Decision by the French Military Authorities to 
Unilaterally Nominate a Naqib al-Asharaf (taken from the Lybyer Papers, University of Illinois)
  
Source: 
The King-Crane Commission Digital Collection, Oberlin College Archives, 
http://dcollections.oberlin.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/kingcrane/id/2091/rec/76 (last 
accessed on 14.02.2014). 
 
Note the personal signatures without seals on this petition. 
 
 
